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Abstract
Cash dilution, the effect of performance reduction through cash, exists
in almost every illiquid fund. This article provides a brief overview of the
problems of cash dilution in illiquid private equity fund of funds, a formula
for the calculation of the cost of cash dilution, two possible solutions for
the reduction of cash dilution (namely the over-commitment strategy and
a formula to calculate the optimal degree of investment in other assets),
an evaluation of the effect of cash dilution in private equity fund of funds,
and an evaluation of the usefulness of the over-commitment strategy.
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1 Introduction
In illiquid markets, like the private equity market, committed capital can neither
be invested nor liquidated at any point in time. As long as the invested capital
is less than the committed capital, the fund holds cash. This cash portion
of a fund reduces the performance. This performance reduction is called cash
dilution or cash drag, because the performance of a fund is diluted or dragged
down by cash (Liaw and Moy, 2000).
There are basically two reasons for cash dilution in private equity funds,
namely the not yet invested and the already liquidated capital.
The practice shows that the average private equity fund needs up to six years
to invest its committed capital. This long investment period can be traced back
to limited investment possibilities and high illiquidity of assets. During the
investment period the not yet invested assets consist of cash that dilutes the
return. However this cash, and therefore also the first source of cash dilution,
decreases with the increasing number of investments.
The second source of cash dilution in private equity funds consists of cash
that accrues from the liquidation of investments. Most funds are limited to a
ten-year term. Since the majority of private equity investments are middle to
long term, a fund can only invest during the first six years (Toll and Galante,
2001; Fenn, Liang, and Prowse, 1995). Although the amount of committed
capital is still the same, the invested capital decreases slowly. Because of this,
the cash portion of a fund, and therefore also the cash dilution, increases towards
the end of the term.
For the graphic illustration of the problem of cash dilution, the cumulated
distributions (liquidations) are subtracted from the cumulated takedowns (in-
vestments) so that the cumulated cash flows can be seen. If these cumulated
cash flows are expressed as a percentage of the committed capital, they corre-
spond to the investment level of the fund.
The problem of cash dilution can be dealt with more easily by diversified
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Figure 1: Regression of mean investment levels from private equity funds from
1986 to 1995
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fund of funds than by normal funds, since the cash flows of specialized private
equity funds depend greatly on macroeconomic developments (Berger and Udell,
1998). This can primary be traced back to the small number of investments
as well as to the specialization in a certain investment class (venture capital,
buyout or mezzanine debt), industry or region. In highly diversified private
equity fund of funds, cash flows are more static and therefore also easier to
analyze and anticipate. The degree of diversification and the high number of
indirect investments through participation in different funds also characterize
the virtual fund of funds of pension funds (Brophy and Guthner, 1988). That
is why the following explanations can also be applied to virtual fund of funds.
2 Analysis of the cash flows
The problem of cash dilution can only be diminished if the investor can antici-
pate the cash flows of the funds, because if cash flows occur unforeseen, he must
quickly buy or sell illiquid assets at possibly unfavorable prices (Bader, 1996).
In the following, the cash flow patterns (i.e. the structure and behavior of
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the cash flows) shall be analyzed. The cumulated distributions and takedowns
are calculated using data provided by Venture Economics. The following para-
graphs will show how Venture Economics publishes the data and simplifying
assumptions of the calculation.
2.1 Data characteristics and assumptions
The different investment classes, industries and regions show varying cash flow
patterns. In modeling a private equity fund of funds, the question of how to
diversify has to be addressed. Because of a lack of data from the European and
Asian private equity markets, this study only employs data from the American
market. Therefore, the cash flow patterns to be presented are not grouped
by regions. For the sake of simplicity, the investment classes and industry
sectors were grouped after market capitalization. The investment classes venture
capital, buyout and mezzanine debt, as well as the different industry sectors will
be included according to their share of the American private equity market.
The different vintage years also display varying cash flow patterns. It can
be shown that the takedown patterns changed dramatically during the past few
years. Since the mid-eighties, funds no longer call their capital after a fixed
takedown schedule, but rather just-in-time (Toll and Galante, 2001). Moreover,
the distribution patterns have also changed. In the early eighties, most funds
departed from yearly distributions.
In analyzing the distribution patterns of the funds for the vintage year 1985,
the yearly distributions become clearly discernible. However, as in 1986, the
effect of the yearly distributions can be neglected. The takedown patterns of
1986 and the following years also do not show any fixed takedown schedules.
That is why we will be considering only the vintage years 1986 to 1995.
To improve the analysis of the cash flow patterns, monthly data was pro-
cessed, rather than the quarterly data usual in the private equity industry. Data
is available for the period from January 1986 to November 2000. According to
Fenn and Liang (1998), the database of Venture Economics represents about
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three-quarters of the total private equity market.
2.2 Cash flow patterns
The cash flows are calculated by subtracting the cumulated distributions from
the cumulated takedowns. All ten cash flow patterns of the vintage years 1986
to 1995 have been standardized, whereas the vintage year was attributed to the
year 0.
Figure 2: Cash flow patterns of the vintage years 1986 to 1995
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The calculation shows that after the first year an average of 19.7% of the
committed capital was invested. During the next three years the investment
level slowly increased to 34.9% in the second, 47.8% in the third and 52.9% in
the fourth year, with which the maximum mean investment level was reached.
In the fifth year the investment level decreased to 44.5%. In the sixth year
only an average of 29.3%, in the seventh only 16.5% were invested. After an
average of seven years and four months, the full-invested capital was distributed.
Remarkable is the fact that the overall highest investment level was reached after
four years and six months by the funds of the vintage year 1989 with only 62.0%
of the committed capital.
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This illustration enables us to see that younger funds of the vintage year 1992
were liquidated much more quickly and therefore suffered from a higher degree
of cash dilution than older funds. This can be attributed to faster distribution
patterns. Funds of the vintage year 1992 paid back the committed capital the
quickest. They reached an investment level of zero percent already after an
average of five years and ten months. Black and Gilson (1998) and Gompers
(1998) have shown that higher returns in private equity depend on the strength
of the IPO market. It would therefore be interesting to investigate whether the
acceleration of the distribution patterns could also be put into a direct context
with better IPO conditions.
3 Costs of cash dilution
To calculate the costs of cash dilution in private equity fund of funds, a normal
private equity fund of funds suffering from cash dilution will be compared with
a theoretical private equity fund of funds without cash dilution.
Both fund of funds have a lifespan of ten years (which is entirely usual in the
private equity industry), takedown their total committed capital on the first day
and distribute their returns only on the last day of their term (which is unusual,
but correct for the calculation).
To be able to calculate the return of the theoretical fund of funds without
cash dilution, it has to be assumed that the total committed capital is invested
at the beginning and liquidated at the end of the fund. These assumptions
are extremely unrealistic - because of the high illiquidity, the total committed
capital can neither be invested at time zero nor liquidated immediately at the
end of the fund.
To calculate the return of the normal fund of funds with cash dilution, the
mean cash flow pattern that was shown above will be used. Since a fund of funds
that cannot anticipate the cash flows is not allowed to invest its cash otherwise,
it is assumed that the normal fund of funds with cash dilution invests its cash
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in the money market. The return for these investments is calculated with 5%,
which corresponds approximately to the American money market.
3.1 Performance calculation
To find a good performance measurement turns out to be difficult, since conven-
tional performance measurements (like the internal rate of return) are based on
cash flows or invested capital, respectively. To be able to analyze the problem
of cash dilution, a performance measurement that measures committed capital
is needed.
Two measurements are calculated here: the ratio of distributions to com-
mitted capital and the return on committed capital, whereby both measure
committed capital. The ratio of distribution to committed capital is calculated
by dividing the sum of all distributions by the committed capital. The return
on committed capital is calculated by dividing the distributions minus the take-
downs by the committed capital.
To simulate equivalent investments by the theoretical fund of funds without
cash dilution and the normal fund of funds with cash dilution, the internal rate
of return of the private equity investments of the normal fund of funds with
cash dilution is calculated. The investments of the theoretical fund of funds are
then calculated using the same internal rate of return.
Since the theoretical fund of funds without cash dilution calculates its in-
vestments with the same internal rate of return, and only has two cash flows
(the investment of the full capital at time zero and the liquidation at time ten),
the capital that is distributed by the theoretical fund of funds can be calculated
through transformation of the equation of the internal rate of return:
CFt = CF0(1 + IRR)L
Whereby CF corresponds to the committed capital, L to the duration and IRR
to the internal rate of return of the normal fund of funds with cash dilution.
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Based on the mean cash flows calculated above, the normal fund of funds with
cash dilution has an internal rate of return of 17.6%. The theoretical fund
of funds without cash dilution therefore distributes 5.059 times its committed
capital.
A mean normal fund of funds with cash dilution from the vintage years
1986 to 1995 realizes with private equity investments 1.858 times its committed
capital during the ten years, and on the money market it achieves 0.553 times
its committed capital. A normal fund of funds can therefore distribute 2.411
times its committed capital after ten years.
Table 1: Performance with and without cash dilution
With Without
cash dilution cash dilution
Return on
committed capital 141.1% 405.9%
Distribution to
committed capital 2.411 5.059
The performance measurements can be calculated as follows: The yearly
returns for fund of funds with cash dilution come to 9.2%, for the fund of funds
without cash dilution to 17.6%, which corresponds exactly to the internal rate
of return. In the following, only total returns will be regarded, since yearly
returns for illiquid investments, which have to be held for ten years, are not
really indicative.
3.2 Calculation of the costs of cash dilution
For an ended or nearly ended fund, the following formula can be used to calculate
the costs of cash dilution.
CD =
(1 + IRR)L − DC
(1 + IRR)L − 1
Whereby CD corresponds to the cost of cash dilution, L to the duration, D
to the cumulated distributions, C to the committed capital, and IRR to the
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internal rate of return of the fund.
The cost of cash dilution of a fund of funds therefore equals an average
performance loss of 65.2% after a ten-year period. Thus, nearly two-thirds of
the return of a fund of funds are wiped out by cash dilution.
At the first glance, the enormous effect of cash dilution on private equity
fund of funds is astonishing. Considering the fact that a fund of funds with
cash dilution has an average investment level of only 21.4% during its ten-year
period, the high loss of nearly two-thirds of the return seems plausible.
4 Reduction of cash dilution
To reduce the problem of cash dilution there are above all two possibilities.
On the one hand, the cash of the not yet invested and the already liquidated
capital can be invested in other assets. On the other hand, the over-commitment
strategy offers another possibility to reduce the effect of cash dilution.
4.1 Reduction of cash dilution with over-commitment
If a fund of funds over-commits its capital, it is committing more capital than
it actually owns. In this case, the commitments exceed the fund size. Since
the commitments of a private equity fund of funds are not all called down at
the same time, over-commitment strategies are possible. The aim of an over-
commitment strategy should be to achieve an investment level of 100%.
There is hardly any scientific literature dealing with cash flow patterns and
over-commitment strategy. The only work worthy of mention is by Robin and
Marsal (2000). The authors are of the opinion that a fund of funds should
over-commit its capital by 13% in order not to be underinvested. When asked,
Henry Robin said that the value of 13% was not determined through empirical
work, but through long practical experience. However, the above analysis of the
cash flow patterns showed that the over-commitment level must be higher than
13% if a fund of funds is to be fully invested.
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Supposing that the cash flows are approximately normally distributed at the
point of time of the maximal investment level, the optimal over-commitment
level can be calculated by means of an assessment function.
OCopt =
1
µmax + d1−α σmax√n
Whereby µmax corresponds to the mean of the maximal investment level, σmax
to the appropriate standard deviation, n to the amount of invested funds, and
α to the error possibility or the possibility of reaching an investment level over
100%.
The mean of the highest investment level can be read from the cash flow
pattern above; it equals 52.9%. Unfortunately, Venture Economics could not
provide this work with standard deviations, but since it can be assumed that
the investment level never rises above 100%, the standard deviation can be
estimated. This can be done by assuming that the over-commitment level of
a fund of funds with only one investment is exactly zero. Accordingly, the
standard deviation is approximately 20.2%. The value of d1−α for a one-percent
error quota comes to 2.327. If a fund of funds invests in 50 different funds, it
could over-commit its capital by 67.9%. With this over-commitment level, a
fund of funds reaches a maximal investment level of 88.8%. The residual 11.2%
are held in cash in case the invested funds do not exactly reflect the underlying
average cash flow patterns.
The question of the risk of the over-commitment strategy is justified. The
risk of the over-commitment strategy consists of the illiquidity of the fund of
funds. A fund of funds becomes insolvent if the maximal investment level rises
above 100%. The risk of insolvency can be countered with a credit line. As
long as the costs of the credit line are lower then the internal rate of return
of the private equity investments, there is no loss through an over-commitment
strategy. The risk of a correctly managed over-commitment strategy is therefore
minimal.
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4.2 Reduction of cash dilution with other assets
Another possibility of reducing the problem of cash dilution is the investment
of cash in other assets. However, this strategy should not be regarded as an
optimal solution. With the investment of cash in other assets, the return of a
private equity fund is not as strongly diluted as it was, but the other assets
are falsifying it. This return falsification leads to higher correlations of the
private equity fund of funds. However, most of the time it is exactly these low
correlations of private equity with other assets that are an important reason to
invest in private equity fund of funds.
To be able to meaningfully plan investments and not precipitously liquidate
assets at unfavorable prices, it is imperative to anticipate the cash flow patterns.
Supposing that the cash flow patterns are approximately normally distributed,
the optimal investment level can be calculated as follows:
ILt = 1−
(
µt + d1−α
σt√
n
)
(1 +OC)
Whereby ILt corresponds to the optimal investment level of the period t, µt to
the mean cash flow of the period t, σt to its standard deviation, α to the error
possibility or the possibility of reaching an investment level over 100%, n to the
number of invested funds, and OC to the level of over-commitment.
The risk of investing the cash in other assets equals the performance loss
that arises when an asset has to be liquidated precipitously. However, as long
as the total return of the investment after the precipitous liquidation is still
positive, the strategy of investing the cash in other assets does not entail any
costs, and the risk is therefore minimal.
4.3 Benefits of anti-dilution strategies
To calculate the benefits of the over-commitment strategy, a normal fund of
funds with cash dilution is compared to a fund of funds with over-commitment
and to a theoretical fund of funds without cash dilution.
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Basically the same assumptions as in the calculation of the costs of cash
dilution are used. For the fund of funds with over-commitment, an optimal
over-commitment level of 67.9% was calculated above.
With these assumptions, a fund of funds with over-commitment is able to
distribute 2.942 times its committed capital after ten years. With the formula
developed above, the costs of cash dilution can easily be calculated as follows:
Table 2: Performance of different anti-dilution strategies
With Over- Without
cash dilution commitment cash dilution
Return on
committed capital 141.1% 194.2% 405.9%
Distribution to
committed capital 2.411 2.942 5.059
Cost of
cash dilution 65.2% 52.2% -
Calculations show that both the over-commitment strategy and the strategy
of investing cash in other assets increase the return of a private equity fund of
funds; therefore both strategies can be regarded as meaningful instruments for
reducing the problem of cash dilution.
5 Conclusion
This article shows that the problem of cash dilution cannot be seen in the
internal rates of return that are published by the private equity funds. On
basis of a constructed mean cash flow pattern, the effect of cash dilution can
be shown. A calculation showed that 65.2%, or in other words nearly two-
thirds of the performance of a fund of funds are diluted by cash. This enormous
performance loss is surprising and shows the significance of the problem of cash
dilution in private equity fund of funds.
In this article, two strategies to reduce the problem of cash dilution were pro-
posed: The over-commitment strategy and the strategy of investing the cash in
other assets, such as public-traded private equity. For the practical implemen-
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tation of these strategies, two formulas were developed to calculate the optimal
over-commitment level and the optimal investment level. A universally valid
over-commitment level could not be calculated, since this depends on the num-
ber of invested funds. However, it was shown that a fund of funds that invests
in fifty well-diversified funds is allowed to over-commit its capital by 67.9%.
With a calculation of the theoretical benefits, it could be shown that an
over-commitment strategy reduces the performance loss from 65.2% to 52.2%.
If, however, the cash is invested in public-traded private equity, concurrent to
the over-commitment strategy, the costs of cash dilution can be reduced even
more.
To conclude, it can be said that the problem of cash dilution in private
equity should not be neglected. But recognizing it is made much more difficult
by the way private equity funds publish their returns. Therefore, a formula was
developed in this article with which the cost of cash dilution can be calculated.
Another possibility of determining the costs of cash dilution would be with the
help of a performance measurement of the committed capital, not of the internal
rate of return based on the invested capital. It is therefore proposed that private
equity funds publish the return on committed capital in addition to the internal
rate of return. The additional transparency achieved in this way would make it
possible for investors to determine how effective a fund manages the problem of
cash dilution.
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